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ON  “CLEAR  AND  PRESENT  DANGER”
Leslie Kendrick*
INTRODUCTION
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dissent in United States v. Abrams gave us
the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor and the “clear and present danger”
test.1  Too often unremarked is the contradiction between the two.  At the
same time that Holmes says “the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,” he also says that “the
present danger of immediate evil” permits Congress to restrict the expression
of opinion.2  When the anticipated harm comes about through acceptance of
the speaker’s idea, then the imposition of the clear and present danger test
stops the operation of the marketplace of ideas.3  The market is not free if
the clear and present danger test intervenes right when an idea gains
traction.
In Abrams, the “evil” that preoccupied Congress was the embrace of
socialism and concomitant opposition to the World War I draft.  The five
defendants in Abrams had printed and distributed circulars aimed at persuad-
ing the market to accept the truth of their socialist perspective on the war.4
Holmes concluded that the printing and distribution of the circulars did not
present a clear and present danger.  “[N]obody,” he said, “can suppose that
the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without
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1 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2 Id.
3 See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1,
17–22 (“Holmes’s ‘clear and present danger’ formula allows government officials to pro-
hibit expression precisely when such speech threatens to incite action.  An interpretation
of the first amendment that permits the state to cut off expression as soon as it comes close
to being effective essentially limits the amendment’s protection to encompass only abstract
or innocuous communication.” (footnote omitted)); see also Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 910–12 (1963).
4 See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 617–18.
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more, would present any immediate danger that its opinions would hinder
the success of the government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do
so.”5  But had Holmes concluded that the leaflets did present a clear and
present danger of persuading others of the truth of the defendants’ perspec-
tive, such that opposition to the draft and other war activities increased by
some unspecified degree, the clear and present danger test would have inter-
vened to disrupt the “free trade in ideas”6 that Holmes praised.
If sometimes the clear and present danger test seems to interrupt the
free trade in ideas, there are instances in which it seems to provide more
protection than necessary within the marketplace.  John Stuart Mill gave the
famous example of the speech against the corn dealer:
An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private prop-
erty is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the
press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited
mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about
among the same mob in the form of a placard.7
Mill’s hypothetical imagines that speech in front of the corn dealer’s
house, in front of an angry mob, may be punished.  But intervention at that
time may be too late.  Likewise, Holmes argued that “falsely shouting fire in a
theatre” is not protected by the First Amendment, but it is difficult to under-
stand how to apply the clear and present danger test to such an utterance.8
If the law is serious about prohibiting physical harm as a result of an
exchange of ideas, the clear and present danger standard sometimes does
too little too late.
If the marketplace of ideas and the clear and present danger test are in
tension with each other, either one of them could be identified as the prob-
lem.  The marketplace of ideas has received a great deal of criticism, but
mostly about various forms of market failure.  Less common is a rejection of
the basic idea that, as human beings and subjects of the state, individuals
have a strong interest in receiving information so that they may make their
own decisions about what constitutes a good life and what constitutes good
policy.  Whether a completely unregulated speech market actually provides
adequate information is another matter, but the basic claim to information is
commonly accepted.  If it remains so, then the clear and present danger test
is an intervention that overrides this claim to information in some contexts.
As such, it requires some justification.
For many years, the clear and present danger test received its share of
criticism.9  Recently, however, few have focused on its difficulties.  This is,
perhaps, because technically speaking it is no longer a current doctrinal stan-
dard, having been superseded in the context of incitement and subversive
5 Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 630.
7 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 55 (Alburey Castell ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1947)
(1859).
8 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
9 See infra Parts I–II.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL405.txt unknown Seq: 3 29-MAY-19 15:33
2019] on  “clear  and  present  danger” 1655
advocacy by the test set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio10 (and perhaps, with
some uncertainty as to their remaining force, cases such as Yates v. United
States,11 Scales v. United States,12 and Noto v. United States13).  Yet the clear and
present danger test is still with us.  It is the shaping force behind Brandenburg
and the dominant popular articulation of when incendiary or objectionable
speech loses its protection.14  It informs state laws on unlawful assembly and
breach of the peace.15  Also, when courts encounter speech for which the
Supreme Court has not developed a clearly articulated standard, they often
fall back on the principles of clear and present danger or Brandenburg,
whether they make sense in the given area or not.16
If the clear and present danger test still exerts force, it also still carries
the mysteries it has had since the beginning.  The most frequent criticisms
are that it is hard to apply and easy to manipulate.  But problems in applica-
tion are only the last of several along the line from conceptualizing to imple-
menting the standard.  In many ways, it raises as many questions as it answers.
This Article addresses some of these questions.
I. CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER, THEN AND NOW
The clear and present danger test originated in Schenck v. United States.17
Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court upholding the defendants’ convic-
tions under the Espionage Act for overseeing the distribution of socialist leaf-
lets, utilized the term “clear and present danger” in rejecting the claim that
the convictions violated the First Amendment.18  In doing so, Holmes articu-
lated an approach to subversive advocacy rooted in his views on criminal
attempt:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such cir-
cumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. . . . If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) its tendency and
10 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (per curiam) (developed the
current standard for unprotected incitement discussed in Part I).
11 354 U.S. 298 (1957), overruled by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
12 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
13 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
14 See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 522 (2004)
(“[E]xactly fifty years after Schenck, the Supreme Court finally and unambiguously
embraced the Holmes-Brandeis version of clear and present danger[.]”).
15 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-406 (West 2018) (“Whenever three or more persons
assembled share the common intent to advance some lawful or unlawful purpose by the
commission of an act or acts of unlawful force or violence likely to jeopardize seriously
public safety, peace or order, and the assembly actually tends to inspire persons of ordinary
courage with well-grounded fear of serious and immediate breaches of public safety, peace
or order, then such assembly is an unlawful assembly.”).
16 See infra Part II; see also infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
17 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
18 Id.
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the intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no ground for
saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime.19
In The Common Law, Holmes had suggested that liability for criminal
attempt and other inchoate crimes required both criminal intent and action
that came close to achieving a crime.20  Thus, if a speaker intended to bring
about an unlawful occurrence, and his speech created a clear and present
danger of that occurrence, then the speech could be punished.  The upshot
of applying a standard for liability for inchoate crimes was that Holmes did
not understand the First Amendment to provide additional protections in
this situation beyond those offered by general criminal law principles.  Clear
and present danger was part of the exact same standard of liability that he
would have applied in cases of criminal attempt, whether or not speech was
involved.
Holmes’s views changed between Schenck and Abrams, as has been docu-
mented exhaustively.21  At the encouragement of Professor Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., Holmes repurposed clear and present danger into a First Amend-
ment standard that drew a line between protected speech and unprotected
subversive advocacy:
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would justify
punishing persuasion to murder, the United States constitutionally may pun-
ish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent
danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the
United States constitutionally may seek to prevent. . . .
. . . It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring
it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion
where private rights are not concerned.22
Later cases would largely forget Holmes’s suggestion that intent to cause
harm was an independent and sufficient basis on which to restrict advocacy.
The likelihood of a clear and present danger would come to occupy the field.
Indeed, during the 1940s, the Supreme Court suggested that “clear and
present danger” could function as an all-purpose test to determine the scope
of free speech protection.  For example, discussing “peaceful and truthful
discussion of matters of public interest,” the Court in Thornhill v. Alabama
said, “abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only where
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 66–67 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1881).
21 See, e.g., DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 346 (1997); David
S. Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 163–74
(1982); Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 726 (1975); David M. Rabban, The Emergence
of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1208–09 (1983) [hereinafter
Rabban, The Emergence]; Fred D. Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
and the Clear and Present Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919, 58 J. AM. HIST. 24, 25
(1971); G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The
Human Dimension, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 392 (1992).
22 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627–28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no
opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the
market of public opinion.”23  This formulation suggests that clear and pre-
sent danger is the standard for all regulations that abridge truthful and
peaceful discussion—apparently including time-place-manner regulations,
obscenity regulations, and so forth.24  This proposition was almost immedi-
ately put to the test in several contexts, including picketing and obscenity,
where the Court began to develop other standards.25
Developments in the 1950s and 1960s led many to conclude that the
clear and present danger test was no longer good law, even in its core area of
operation.  Beginning with Dennis v. United States, the Supreme Court for a
time embraced Chief Judge Learned Hand’s reformulation of the test.26
Although Hand claimed to be applying the clear and present danger stan-
dard, and although the Supreme Court in Dennis seemingly took him at his
word, commentators noticed a strong divergence.  Hand transformed the
clear and present danger test into straightforward cost-benefit analysis—into,
in fact, the Hand formula that he also applied in United States v. Carroll Tow-
ing Co. and other torts cases to define negligent conduct.27  Alexander
Meiklejohn and Thomas Emerson concluded that the test had been aban-
doned.28  Justice Brennan, writing in 1965, observed, “[t]here are many who
23 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104–05 (1940); see, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252, 262–63 (1941) (“And very recently we have also suggested that ‘clear and present
danger’ is an appropriate guide in determining the constitutionality of restrictions upon
expression. . . . What finally emerges from the ‘clear and present danger’ cases is a working
principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before utterances can be punished.”).
24 But see Hans A. Linde, Comment, “Clear and Present Danger” Reexamined: Dissonance in
the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1163 (1970) (criticizing suggestions that
clear and present danger works for all purposes).
25 Id. at 1169.
26 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (plurality opinion).  In Hand’s reformulation, courts
“must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S.
494 (1951)).
27 Compare id., with United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947).
28 Emerson, supra note 3, at 912 (1963) (“The clear and present danger test was aban-
doned by a majority of the Supreme Court in the Dennis case.  The substitute—the gravity
of the evil, discounted by its improbability—excised the main features of the original test
by eliminating or minimizing the requirement that the danger be immediate and clear.
The present status of the clear and present danger test is thus in some doubt.  There is still
some blood remaining in the doctrine, and it has continued to be used in certain types of
situations.  But, as a general test of the limits of the first amendment, the clear and present
danger test must be regarded as unacceptable.” (footnote omitted)); Alexander
Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 4, 13
(1961) (stating in discussing Dennis that “the Court has reinstated as ‘controlling’ the
‘clear and present danger’ test of 1919, but with the words ‘clear’ and ‘present’ left out”
(footnote omitted)).
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doubt that this test has much vitality today.”29
But the Supreme Court never abandoned clear and present danger.  In
Dennis, the Court was still taking the same general kind of approach pre-
scribed by Holmes: hinging speech protection on a context-specific risk
assessment of the likely results of speech.  Those pronouncing the death of
clear and present danger were discussing the substitution of one context-
specific risk assessment for another.  Meanwhile, elsewhere the principles of
clear and present danger were alive and well.  It influenced the “fighting
words” doctrine, which permits regulation of speech directed at the listener
and likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction.30  It was invoked in
“heckler’s veto” cases such as Feiner v. New York, decided the same year as
Dennis, where the Court upheld a criminal penalty levied against a speaker
whose words were likely to provoke violence against him.31  It was influential
in Cohen v. California, where the Court struck down Cohen’s conviction for
wearing a jacket with the slogan “Fuck the Draft” under California’s disor-
derly conduct law.32  Because Cohen was prosecuted for the slogan, without
regard for how likely it was to provoke negative reactions, his conviction
could be understood as an application of neither the fighting words doctrine
nor the heckler’s veto doctrine.33
The Supreme Court reaffirmed clear and present danger in Brandenburg
v. Ohio, which set the current standard for unprotected incitement.34  The
Brandenburg Court held that
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.35
With this standard, the Court affirmed the basic principle of the clear and
present danger test: that the risk posed by speech in its immediate context is
a factor that must be considered in deciding when it can be regulated.
Under Brandenburg, courts should invalidate any restriction on persuasive
29 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1965).
30 See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
31 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951).
32 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16–17 (1971).
33 Id. at 20 (rejecting arguments that Cohen’s jacket could be punished under the
fighting words or heckler’s veto doctrines in part because “[t]here is, as noted . . . no
showing that anyone who saw Cohen was in fact violently aroused or that appellant
intended such a result”).
34 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (per curiam) (striking down a law
punishing “persons who ‘advocate or teach the duty, necessity, or propriety’ of violence ‘as
a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform’; or who publish or circulate or
display any book or paper containing such advocacy” (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2923.13 (West 1958)).
35 Id. at 447.
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speech that does not take likely effects into account in keeping with the clear
and present danger standard.
If clear and present danger is still with us, so are its difficulties.
Although the test is most often criticized as difficult to apply, more funda-
mental is the problem of when, if ever, it is the appropriate standard—or
part of the appropriate standard—on which to judge the protection for
speech under the First Amendment.
II. FALLIBILITY AND MANIPULABILITY
Critics have questioned the clear and present danger test from its very
inception.  The earliest and most common criticisms were about the fact that
it requires judges to assess the dangerousness of speech.  Judges are not par-
ticularly equipped to do this, critics have said, and they are no less susceptible
to uproar or hysteria than other public officials.  For these reasons, the test is
difficult to apply consistently, easy to manipulate, and unlikely to hold up in
the very situations where it is most required.  Hand voiced this concern in a
letter to Chafee shortly after Holmes first developed the test:
I am not wholly in love with Holmesy’s test and the reason is this.  Once
you admit that the matter is one of degree, while you may put it where it
genuinely belongs, you so obviously make it a matter of administration, i.e.
you give to Tomdickandharry, D.J., so much latitude . . . that the jig is at
once up.  Besides their Ineffabilities, the Nine Elder Statesmen, have not
shown themselves wholly immune from the “herd instinct” and what seems
“immediate and direct” to-day may seem very remote next year even though
the circumstances surrounding the utterance be unchanged.  I own I should
prefer a qualitative formula, hard, conventional, difficult to evade.36
Indeed, Chafee himself was not particularly entranced with Holmes’s
approach.  Professor David Rabban has observed:
It is a major irony of the first amendment tradition that both Chafee,
the most effective advocate of the “clear and present danger” test, and Bran-
deis, the Justice who did most to add substance to this phrase, seem to have
recognized its deficiencies.  Instead of a test dependent upon predicting the
potential consequences of speech, both seem to have preferred an approach
analyzing the meaning of the offending words themselves, the method sug-
gested by some of the prewar commentary on the first amendment and
employed by Learned Hand in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten.  Yet Brandeis,
Chafee, and other civil libertarians were not willing to abandon what looked,
36 Letter from Judge Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law
School (Jan. 2, 1921), in Gunther, supra note 21, at 770.  Later in Dennis, Hand would
apply his own version of clear and present danger, see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951); supra note 26 and accompanying text, but his applying existing law in his capacity
as an appeals court judge should not be confused for personal endorsement.  He articu-
lated his own view as a district court judge in 1917 in the Masses case, where he proposed
that the proper test was whether the speech in question amounted to direct advocacy of
overthrow of the government. See Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917),
rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
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especially after Abrams, like one of the few hints of tolerance in the history of
Supreme Court adjudication of first amendment issues.  They tried to make
the most of a bleak situation, in part by ignoring prior hostile decisions and
in part by [reading] . . . [“]the dissenting Abrams eloquence . . . back into
Schenck as though it had been there all the time.”37
Since its inception, the test has been criticized time and again for
depending too much on circumstances38 and thereby giving judges too
much discretion39 and failing to give speakers proper notice of the legality of
their activities.40  Because of these features, the clear and present danger test
was sometimes likened to ad hoc balancing and criticized for presenting simi-
lar problems.41
For these reasons, Meiklejohn concluded that “the ‘clear and present
danger’ formula denies rather than expresses the meaning of the Constitu-
37 Rabban, The Emergence, supra note 21, at 1212 (second omission in original) (foot-
note omitted) (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Professor Ernst Freund and Debs v. United States,
40 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 238 (1973)).
38 John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing
in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1493 n.44 (1975) (“[A] given message
will be sometimes protected and sometimes not, depending on the actual or projected
behavior of the audience in response to it.”); Emerson, supra note 3, at 911 (“In all but the
simplest situations the factual judgment demanded of the court is difficult or impossible to
make through the use of judicial procedures.”); Linde, supra note 24, at 1169.
39 Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
449, 474 (1985) (“In crafting standards to govern specific areas of first amendment dis-
pute, courts that adopt the pathological perspective should place a premium on confining
the range of discretion left to future decisionmakers who will be called upon to make
judgments when pathological pressures are most intense.  Constitutional standards that are
highly outcome-determinative of the cases to which they apply are thus to be preferred.
This observation would counsel against standards such as the clear-and-present-danger test
and its many variants that require in their application a contemporary assessment of social
conditions.”).
40 Emerson, supra note 3, at 911 (“The clear and present danger test is excessively
vague.  As experience has shown, its application by the Court leads to no one ascertainable
result.  And for the main participants in the system of freedom of expression—police, pros-
ecutors, and other officials on the one hand and the individual seeking to exercise his
rights on the other—the test furnishes little clarity in advance of a judicial decision.”);
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 888–89 (1970) (“The
clear and present danger test—or the ‘gravity discounted by improbability’ test—avoids
overinclusive characterization of unprotected conduct at the risk of providing no charac-
terization at all which is determinate and focused enough to give warning in advance of
conduct how far an overbroad statute may permissibly reach.  Absent specific per se catego-
ries which define the character of privileged conduct, a danger test is little more than an
adjuration that the Court carefully inspect the conduct of a particular complainant to see
whether under the circumstances the interest in expression overrides governmental inter-
ests in intervention.  Such a device is indistinguishable in operation from the process of
piecemeal, ad hoc excision and does not meet the need to restructure a substantially over-
broad statute in order to dissipate its chilling effect.” (footnotes omitted)).
41 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 38, at 1493 n.44; Emerson, supra note 3, at 910–12; Note,
supra note 40, at 887–89.
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tion.”42  On Meiklejohn’s view, the clear and present danger test was not a
clear rule—it was an easily manipulated standard that was at odds with the
First Amendment.  These problems of unbounded discretion and manipula-
bility have always been among the criticisms of clear and present danger, but
they express only one of its many difficulties.
III. UNSUITABILITY BEYOND PERSUASIVE SPEECH
Another problem arises from the diversity of activities and purposes
potentially encompassed within “freedom of speech.”  After a majority of the
Supreme Court endorsed clear and present danger, the Court sometimes
suggested that it was the single test of First Amendment protection.  In Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, for example, the Court held that the clear and present danger
standard governed picketing and other activity at the site of a labor dispute,
and the Court further implied confidence in the test as an all-purpose tool.43
In Bridges v. California, the Court acknowledged that it had “suggested that
‘clear and present danger’ is an appropriate guide in determining the consti-
tutionality of restrictions upon expression.”44  But “speech” performs all sorts
of functions and poses all sorts of risks.  Not all “speech” within “freedom of
speech” poses risks well described in terms of clear and present danger.
Early ambitions for the standard were thus doomed to failure: it could not
define the line between unprotected and protected speech for all purposes.
The difficulty was, and is, that speech can pose many risks other than in-
the-moment positive or negative reactions that could lead to harmful results.
Some of these harms have nothing to do with the content of the speech—for
example, streets and sidewalks blocked by demonstrations, or loud noise
caused by sound trucks.  Other harms arise from the content of speech but
have little to do with imminent risk.45  In the obscenity context, for example,
the Court concluded that the line between protected speech and unpro-
42 Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,
246 n.4 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERN-
MENT 92 (1948)).
43 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940) (“The power and the duty of the
State to take adequate steps to preserve the peace and to protect the privacy, the lives, and
the property of its residents cannot be doubted.  But no clear and present danger of
destruction of life or property, or invasion of the right of privacy, or breach of the peace
can be thought to be inherent in the activities of every person who approaches the prem-
ises of an employer and publicizes the facts of a labor dispute involving the latter.”).
44 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262 (1941).
45 See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 3, at 911 (“The doctrine grew out of cases where the
restriction at issue was a direct prohibition of expression by criminal or similar sanctions,
and is of doubtful application to other kinds of interference with freedom of expression.
In a legislative investigating case, for example, a rule allowing the committee to inquire
about expression that might create a clear and present danger of some substantive evil
would seem to impose no limits whatever upon the scope of investigation into expression.
And where the regulation in question is not aimed directly at punishing a particular utter-
ance but affects freedom of expression in a more generalized or indirect way, as in a tax
law or a disclosure requirement, the issues are not framed in terms of whether a specific
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tected obscenity did not depend on a clear and present danger.  Instead, it
was defined by the content—its prurience and its value.46  Struggles like the
one over obscenity prompted Hans Linde to observe that “the Supreme
Court has had trouble with the question whether it is intrinsic content or
extrinsic circumstances that take some kinds of expression outside the pro-
tection of the first amendment.”47  As the Court adopted new constitutional
standards for libel, invasion of privacy, threats, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and other kinds of speech, it did not invoke clear and present
danger.  Instead, it mostly relied on standards attempting to define protec-
tion by the “intrinsic content” of the speech and the state of mind of the
speaker.
Nevertheless, when courts today encounter speech for which the
Supreme Court has not set out a specific test, they sometimes fall back upon
the concept of clear and present danger, regardless of how appropriate that
seems.  In particular, they utilize the Brandenburg factors, which incorporate
the earlier clear and present danger test.  For example, courts have fallen
back on Brandenburg in addressing speech that teaches how to commit a
crime.48  In several cases involving instructions for tax fraud,49 courts have
concluded that the instruction had to meet the Brandenburg criteria in order
to fall outside the protection of the First Amendment.50  Curiously, the
courts concluded that the speech did meet the Brandenburg criteria, even
though it was implausible to say that it threatened “imminent” lawlessness.51
Instructions on how to commit tax fraud only pose “imminent” peril if “immi-
nent” is defined as between now and the end of tax season.52  Construing
imminence in this extended sense undermines the entire point of the clear
and present danger test and risks distorting Brandenburg into something
closer to the old “bad tendency” test that Holmes rejected.
Courts facing cases involving criminal instruction have other options.  In
some instances, such as the tax fraud cases, they could conclude that the
speech falls outside the scope of the First Amendment altogether, much like
conspiracy and criminal solicitation.  Alternatively, the courts could develop
a standard distinguishing between instruction that is covered by the First
utterance creates a specific danger.  In any event, the clear and present danger test has not
been applied in such cases.”).
46 See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
47 Linde, supra note 24, at 1169.
48 Leslie Kendrick, Note, A Test for Criminally Instructional Speech, 91 VA. L. REV. 1973
(2005).
49 See id. at 1975 n.4.
50 See id.
51 Id. at 1993.
52 See id. at 1993–94 (discussing the distortion required of the imminence require-
ment to allow tax code violations to satisfy this prong of the Brandenburg test).
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Amendment and instruction that is not.53  This standard would not need to
depend on clear and present danger any more than the standard for obscen-
ity does.  It could address the real harm of instructional speech—which is not
so much that the speech persuades others to commit crimes as that it pro-
vides them the means to do so.  Instead, reliance on the clear and present
danger test has arguably interfered with the development of this area of law.
The fact that courts view Brandenburg as relevant is an indication of the power
of the clear and present danger test as a core First Amendment principle.
IV. PERSUASIVE SPEECH AND CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
More important, however, is whether the clear and present danger test
asks the right questions within its original scope of operation.  One might ask
what the original scope of the proposition is.  As noted earlier, the clear and
present danger test existed for some time as a potential all-purpose standard
for speech protection.  This proved untenable, as perhaps should have been
clear from the beginning.  Holmes originally described the scope of the pro-
position as follows: “It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an
intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expres-
sion of opinion where private rights are not concerned.”54  To Holmes, the
realm at issue was “expression of opinion,” and “clear and present danger”
was the appropriate test within that realm, so long as “private rights” were not
implicated.55  Later cases suggested that the only type of speech at issue was
subversive advocacy—expression of opinion directed particularly at criticiz-
ing the government and seeking to overturn it.56  Still later, with Branden-
burg, the Court broadened the scope to “advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation.”57  This reformulation stops short of all expression of opinion
but includes all advocacy of violence or law violation, including apparently
advocacy of jaywalking or other minor infractions.
Meanwhile, the test has also had influence in the realm of expression of
opinion that repels rather than persuades.  Cases involving negative reactions
to speech, including Cantwell v. Connecticut58 and Feiner v. New York,59
invoked clear and present danger as the relevant standard as a matter of
course.  Unlawful assembly laws and other contemporary standards do not
53 See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1106 (2005)
(proposing a test for crime-facilitating speech); Kendrick, supra note 48, at 1995–96 (pro-
posing a test for criminal instruction).
54 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
55 Id.
56 See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 (1961).
57 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
58 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
59 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951).
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distinguish between violence encouraged by speech and negative reactions
against it, and they tend to track the principles of clear and present danger.60
Whatever the precise scope of the clear and present danger test, it per-
tains to expressions of opinion, or some subset of expressions of opinion,
that might either persuade or provoke a negative reaction.  In this arena, it is
not obvious that it is the right test, either in terms of the values underlying
free speech or in terms of the harms that might outweigh speech values in
some contexts.
A. The Danger of Ideas
One difficulty with Holmes’s view in the early cases is that it is not clear
whether he is talking about only preventing dangerous actions—such as
falsely shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater—or also about preventing the
adoption of ideas and attitudes that, on the margins, undermine the Ameri-
can project.  The speech at issue in cases such as Schenck, Debs v. United
States,61 Frohwerk v. United States,62 and Abrams had more the flavor of the
latter.  In Schenck, the speakers were prosecuted on the theory that they con-
spired to persuade others to oppose or avoid the draft, where draft obstruc-
tion was prohibited by the Espionage Act.63  Under the clear and present
danger test, it would seem that the leaflet in Abrams could be punished if it
were capable of persuading others of the wrongness of the draft, such that
they might oppose it to some unspecified degree.
Holmes’s language suggests that causing others to hold anti-American
ideas may be among “the substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre-
vent.”64  He defines as his subject the limits placed on “the expression of
opinion,” and he argues that “Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to
change the mind of the country,” which implies that Congress can forbid
some effort to change the mind of the country.65  Holmes then describes the
danger at issue as “any immediate danger that [the leaflet’s] opinions would
hinder the success of the government arms or have any appreciable tendency
to do so.”66  But this language is still capacious.  It suggests that a speaker
could be punished for speech that presents a danger of an appreciable tendency
to hinder the success of the government.  There is some possibility here that
speakers could be punished for advocacy that, on the margin, affects the ten-
60 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-406 (West 2018) (“Whenever three or more persons
assembled share the common intent to advance some lawful or unlawful purpose by the
commission of an act or acts of unlawful force or violence likely to jeopardize seriously
public safety, peace or order, and the assembly actually tends to inspire persons of ordinary
courage with well-grounded fear of serious and immediate breaches of public safety, peace
or order, then such assembly is an unlawful assembly.”).
61 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
62 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
63 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48–49 (1919).
64 Id. at 52.
65 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
66 Id.
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dency of others to oppose government aims.  Given this possibility, it is worth
considering how well the clear and present danger test governs this realm of
heterodox ideas.
Application of the clear and present danger test to attempts to persuade
others of ideas that have a tendency to frustrate government aims would
seem to run directly counter to the “marketplace of ideas” framework that
Holmes embraces.  If “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market,”67 then interfering with
speech just as it presents a likelihood that others might resist the draft would
seem to rig the game.  Thomas Emerson criticized the clear and present dan-
ger test on these grounds:
The formula assumes that once expression immediately threatens the
attainment of some valid social objective, the expression can be prohibited.
But no very viable system of freedom of expression can exist under such
limitations.  The basic theory contemplates that conflict with other objec-
tives must occur, and indeed the system can be said to operate only where
such conflict does take place.  To permit the state to cut off expression as
soon as it comes close to being effective is essentially to allow only abstract or
innocuous expression.  In short, a legal formula framed solely in terms of
effectiveness of the expression in influencing action is incompatible with the
existence of free expression.68
If we leave aside the marketplace metaphor, it is not obvious that the
clear and present danger test finds justification in other theories of the First
Amendment.  From an autonomy standpoint, suppressing ideas at the very
point at which they pose some marginal risk of persuading others to oppose
governmental action seems unjustified unless there is some sort of manipula-
tion or coercion in play—and the clear and present danger test does not
require that.69  Meanwhile, it is not clear that such a rule is required on a
democratic self-governance theory.  John Rawls, for example, has criticized
the test for permitting too much regulation.70  On Rawls’s view, a clear and
present danger of just any type of harm is not sufficient to justify governmen-
tal suppression of ideas.  Instead, only a clear and present danger to the dem-
ocratic order itself should override free speech protections.71
At the same time, if the spread of pernicious or illiberal ideas is ever a
harm with which the government may concern itself, perhaps more interven-
tion is needed rather than less.  The clear and present danger standard limits
itself to acute situations, where particular expression is highly likely to have
67 Id. at 630.
68 Emerson, supra note 3, at 910–11.
69 See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 334 (1991), for an attempt to reconfigure the clear and present danger test to meet
this problem. See also infra note 82 and accompanying text.
70 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 348–56 (1993).
71 Id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 779, 802–03 (1994) (“As I read him, Rawls does not mean to argue that this is simply a
greater degree of danger than any other; instead he means to argue that, to regulate politi-
cal speech, government needs an interest of a particular sort.”).
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an immediate, demonstrable impact.  It does not capture speech that erodes
democratic ideals gradually—speech that promotes anti-Semitism and racial
hatred, undermines evidence-based inquiry and argument, or delegitimizes
democratic systems and the rule of law.  The judges who embraced the “bad
tendency” test saw the dangers inherent in speech that erodes rather than
explodes.  The clear and present danger test expressly rejected that
approach.  Other than invoking the marketplace of ideas, Holmes did not
particularly explain why freedom of speech requires a wholesale rejection of
bad tendencies in all contexts.  Justice Brandeis said more in Whitney, in argu-
ing that “the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.
Only an emergency can justify repression.  Such must be the rule if authority
is to be reconciled with freedom.”72  But later caselaw has suggested that
Brandeis’s pronouncements—including that suppression is only justified if
danger is “imminent”—do not apply to all forms of speech.73  To this extent,
the clear and present danger test has not been accepted as striking the
appropriate balance between authority and freedom in all contexts.  Its scope
of operation warrants critical inquiry as much as its alternatives do.
B. The Danger of Concrete Harms
It is not clear how much Holmes means to include marginal damage to,
or frustration of, government objectives in the set of harms to which the clear
and present danger test applies.  But his analogies do envision the test apply-
ing to more concrete harms.  He demonstrates as much in his famous invoca-
tion of “falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”74  Similarly, he
says in Abrams:
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would justify
punishing persuasion to murder, the United States constitutionally may pun-
ish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent
danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the
United States constitutionally may seek to prevent.75
Holmes’s reasoning begins with the types of harm familiar to the criminal
law, and he seems to include them within the ambit of his analysis.
As in the case of speech that frustrates particular societal goals, the
speech Holmes discusses here accomplishes its harm through positive or neg-
ative reactions to the speech’s message.  A die-hard liberal or libertarian
could make the same argument about this type of speech as about speech
frustrating societal goals: that the best test of truth is the power of an idea to
get itself accepted in the market, and the speaker should not be held liable
for others having translated his or her ideas into action.  At the same time,
72 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled
in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
73 See supra Part III (discussing categories of speech that do not employ the clear and
present danger test).
74 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
75 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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however, it is difficult to argue that free speech protections must include all
speech, no matter how closely related to concrete harms the state may seek to
prevent.  The question is whether the clear and present danger test appropri-
ately identifies speech that is sufficiently related to the risk of harm that it
may be restricted.
The clear and present danger test defines proscribable speech in a
purely consequentialist way.  All that matters are the potential risks of speech:
speech that is sufficiently likely to lead to harm is unprotected, while all other
speech is protected.  Accepting for the moment that purely consequentialist
risk assessment is both an acceptable and the exclusive way of determining
protection for expression of opinion, the clear and present danger test is not
obviously an acceptable, let alone exclusive, way of implementing it.
For one thing, the clear and present danger test works better for some
concrete harms than others.76  It does not work for expression of opinion
that causes harm directly, through its utterance rather than through the
choices that its message causes others to make.77  Once upon a time the
Court seemed to recognize this, by identifying a category of fighting words
that “by their very utterance inflict injury” and that do not require applica-
tion of the clear and present danger test to be proscribed.78  Whatever the
problems with fighting words doctrine, it acknowledges that certain harms
are not forestalled by application of a clear and present danger test.  Simi-
larly, the test does not apply to obscenity, whatever its harms are.  The test
also does not capture the risk of opinion or advocacy that works cumula-
tively—this might include certain instances of hostile-environment harass-
ment, some forms of bullying, and persistent cajoling of individuals, say, to
end their lives or take other harmful action.  Repeated, corrosive exposure
causes harm by accumulation, and any one instance is unlikely to trigger reg-
ulation under the clear and present danger test.  A literal reading of
Holmes’s and Brandeis’s opinions would suggest that such harms are not the
type of emergency that justifies suppression.
Even with regard to acute contexts, the clear and present danger test
may not draw the line correctly.  The risk of the test, in general and also as
implemented in American courts over the last decades, is that it may not limit
speech until it is too late.  Mill’s corn dealer example suggests that the speech
against the corn dealer could be prohibited if it occurred on the corn
dealer’s doorstep in front of an angry and hungry mob.79  But American law
would not work to prohibit the three elements of speaker, audience, and
location from coming together in the first place, even if everyone involved
could predict what would result.  Indeed, the test is likely not to kick in until
after the incendiary speech has been uttered.  At this point, harm may be
76 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81.
77 See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? (2005)
(distinguishing speech that harms through utterance from speech that provokes other
harmful action).
78 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
79 See MILL, supra note 7, at 55.
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inevitable.  If the idea is that the state has both the power and the obligation
to prevent concrete harm, the clear and present danger test may often fail to
do the very job it purports to do.
If the clear and present danger test is essentially a consequentialist safety
valve, meant to cut off speech protection where risks of harm are too high,
then it is performing a cost-benefit function.  If cost-benefit analysis is the
order of the day, free speech jurisprudence must explain why the clear and
present danger variety is the right one.  Hand was perhaps not wrong to
translate clear and present danger into cost-benefit terms in Dennis—he just
did so with more candor and less deference toward speech than other itera-
tions.80  The test in its usual form performs its cost-benefits analysis by put-
ting a thumb on the scale against intervention—so much so that it may fail to
head off harm in many cases.  One alternative would be a more Dennis-like,
cost-benefit analysis, with no thumb on the scale, or some middle ground
between the current test and pure cost-benefit analysis.  It is unclear why
exactly the line should be drawn at any point in particular, other than some
rough sense that a particular line strikes the right balance between enhanc-
ing the benefits of speech protections and reducing the risks of concrete
harm.
This analysis assumes that a purely consequentialist approach is the right
one and the only one.  That is not clear either.  I have already noted that the
test is in tension with the marketplace of ideas metaphor Holmes invoked in
purporting to explicate it.  Hand, for one, seemed to think that principles of
democratic self-governance pointed in another direction: the approach he
took in Masses essentially recognized protection for all except those who had
forfeited it by arguing for the rejection of the very Constitution whose protec-
tion they sought.81  This approach makes the scope of protection consonant
with the reasons those protections exist in the first place.  If democratic self-
governance is what is at stake, it does not seem obvious that the clear and
present danger test draws a legitimate line between protected and unpro-
tected speech—or that, if it does, it draws the only legitimate line.
Meanwhile, from an autonomy standpoint, clear and present danger
seems to make little sense.  This is perhaps why autonomy theorists have tried
to translate the test into more palatable frameworks.  Professor David Strauss,
for example, has argued that persuasive speech is protected except in situa-
tions where the listeners’ rationality is effectively overcome—where, for
example, an incendiary speech whips a crowd into such a frenzy that they are
not capable of reasoned responses.82  But this is quite different from what
the clear and present danger test provides on its face.  There is no require-
80 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (quoting United States v. Dennis,
183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)).
81 See Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir.
1917).  For an analysis of why forfeiture arguments might be relevant to incitement and
might explain the Brandenburg requirement of an intent to commit harm, see Leslie Ken-
drick, Essay, Free Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1255 (2014).
82 See Strauss, supra note 69, at 337–39.
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ment that listeners’ rationality be overcome.  A speech from one Klansman to
other Klansmen may present a clear and present danger without short-cir-
cuiting the listeners’ rational faculties: it may work by appealing to beliefs
they already hold.  On an autonomy rationale, the clear and present danger
test appears to be a consequentialist safety valve designed to prevent certain
harms.
Professor Cass Sunstein once observed,
Some judgments are shallow but wide.  In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the
Court adopted a form of the clear and present danger test that is very wide
in the sense that it is used in a great range of cases.  But the Court did not
give a deep theoretical grounding for the test.  It did not, for example, try to
root its test in a conception of democratic deliberation, or explore the link
between the interest in autonomy and the right to free expression.83
The same can be said of the clear and present danger standard itself.
First Amendment doctrine often takes for granted that the test reflects either
an important principle or an unassailable balancing of the value of speech
protection against the risks.  In important respects, however, it is shallow.
CONCLUSION
“Clear and present danger” is a renowned phrase in constitutional law.
From the beginning, however, it was in tension with the equally renowned
concept of the marketplace of ideas.  In addition, it is hard to apply and easy
to manipulate, and its proper scope of application is not well explicated.
From early on, its applications proved more limited than its proponents’
expansive rhetoric suggested, and whether its remaining scope of application
is justified is often assumed rather than explored.  Professor Paul Freund
once said: “No matter how rapidly we utter the phrase ‘clear and present
danger,’ or how closely we hyphenate the words, they are not a substitute for
the weighing of values.”84  This is as true today as it was in 1951 or in 1919.
83 Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 24 (1996).
84 PAUL A. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 27 (1949).
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